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Abstract 
Morality seemingly creates a great cultural divide (Haidt, 2012) — people are pro-choice or pro-
life, for traditional marriage or for equality, and for or against the death penalty.  Our 
understanding of these moral disagreements has important and sometimes even grave 
implications for how we treat others. The present study builds a novel model of belief attribution 
of moral disagreements.  We propose that people attribute moral beliefs to one of three sources: 
savage tendencies, external factors or internal beliefs.  In two experiments, one open-ended and 
one more quantitative, we explored how people attribute moral beliefs. The findings from our 
study suggested that participants do tend to attribute their beliefs and the beliefs of those who 
agree with them to more internal reasons than the beliefs of those who disagree with them for 
issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion.  Additionally, character of the individual had 
only some effects on belief attribution.  These findings inform how we understand moral debates, 
and future research can apply these results to investigate the role of strength of beliefs, 
differences across cultures, and even how research in morality is conducted. 
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Savage, Brainwashed, or Just Like Me: Moral Disagreement Increases External 
Attribution for Beliefs 
“Savages we call them, because their manners differ from ours, which we think the perfection of 
civility; they think the same of theirs.”  
 —Benjamin Franklin, Remarks Concerning the Savages of North America 
 When Europe began its colonization of the Americas and Africa, they were faced with 
populations with different cultural and moral norms.  In response to these cultural differences, 
they deemed the native population nothing short of “savages,” and the native people were 
perceived as lacking the capacity for moral reasoning and in turn slaughtered or enslaved.   
Eventually, the cultural narrative of the “white man’s burden” (Kipling, 1899) took hold, and 
Europe began colonizing and importing Christianity into native culture, schooling the target 
groups in European customs.  In this second stage, the native peoples were seen as having some 
capacity for morality, but their morality was seen as inferior, stemming from irrational, external 
cultural myths and in need of reparation.  Finally, once the native populations started adhering to 
Eurocentric norms, some European leaders recognized that the native others were following an 
internal moral standard and deserved human rights. 
 This shift in perception from savage, to salvageable, to members of a universal humanity 
seemingly parallels how we often understand others who hold differing moral opinions.  We 
often immediately think that they are “savage,” or idiotic, lacking moral reasoning.  Even once 
we remember that others are not actually idiots, we often look to external explanations for their 
beliefs, thinking that they were just raised to believe in irrational positions. In rare cases, we 
might believe that even though others disagree with us, they have deep internal reasons for these 
beliefs.  More likely, this acknowledgment of a strong internal moral compass governing moral 
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beliefs and behaviors occurs only when others agree with our beliefs.  In this paper, we explore 
this three-step model of moral attribution.  When faced with a moral opinion, people believe that 
others are either 1. savage; 2. following external rules; or 3. following an internal moral 
compass.  More specifically, we predict that when others disagree with us, we will view them as 
savages lacking in morality (step 1).  If we know that they are otherwise upstanding citizens, we 
will believe that they are simply brainwashed (step 2).  Only those who agree with us are 
capable, morally-conscious individuals, following an internal moral compass (step 3).  
Early accounts of moral development mirror this three-step process, namely Kohlberg’s 
three stages of moral development.  Following Piaget’s moral development theories (Kohlberg 
1975), Kohlberg conceived of three overarching stages to categorize how moral reasoning 
develops throughout the human lifespan (Kohlberg, 1971).  The first of Kohlberg’s stages is the 
Pre-conventional stage, characteristic of children nine or younger, in which moral reasoning is 
not fully developed and is influenced by outside authority.  It is this stage that may be often 
projected onto target others in cases where the target individual is labelled “savage.”  Second is 
the Conventional stage, characteristic of most adults and adolescents, in which the moral 
standards in the Pre-conventional stage are internalized, but reasoning is still restricted to 
following the internalized version of societal norms.  This stage, when projected onto target 
others, would instigate a “white man’s burden” approach, wherein the target other may be 
perceived as needing adjustment in moral convictions.  The Post-Conventional stage is limited to 
a very small percentage of adults, wherein these adults follow an internal sense of justice based 
on individual rights rather than societal norms (Kohlberg, 1971).  If projected onto others, this 
stage would result in perception of an internal moral compass despite differences of moral 
opinion.  Empirical work has since challenged the validity of Kohlberg’s theory on the basis of 
MORAL DISAGREEMENT  5 
its hypotheticality, its sample-bias, his research design, and more (Gilligan, 1977; Snarey, 1985; 
Gibbs, 1977), but its similarity to the progression of slavery based on moral reasoning suggests 
that it could still be a useful heuristic in considering how people understand moral 
disagreements. 
 Recent research in moral psychology has looked at how people react to those who have 
opposing moral views.  Although disagreements are not limited to an opposition of morals, 
research has shown that disagreements specifically in morality are special in that they produce 
the greatest amount of distancing behavior. For example, people tend to view their moral 
convictions as universally absolute, objective, and independent of authority (Skitka, 2010).  
Moral violations are not as simple as perhaps a disagreement in preference or even culture 
because they are stronger and elicit greater emotion and motivation (Skitka, Bowman, & Sargis 
2005).  Therefore, although a disagreement about preferred ice cream flavor or what movie to 
see would not usually instigate anger or the perception that the opposing belief is fundamentally 
wrong, opposition in moral beliefs has the tendency to do just that.  The difference between the 
strength of reactions and consequences for moral disagreements and other disagreements (Skitka, 
2010), especially in the perception of moral objectivity and universality, is what might make it so 
easy for someone in a moral disagreement to create distance and simply assume that those who 
disagree are morally incapable or inferior. 
 One reason why people may view those who disagree with them as morally inferior could 
be linked to mind attribution, or how much “mind” (i.e. ability to think and act) they ascribe to a 
person in a certain situation (Loughnan, Haslam, Murnane, Vaes, Reynolds & Suitner, 2010).  
Theory of mind is the branch of psychology that attempts to understand and explain how people 
attribute mind to others and predict behavior based on this.  Theory theory, which is a sub-theory 
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of theory of mind, essentially predicts that mind attribution is derived from an external source 
(Carruthers & Smith, 1996).  Simulation theory, however, predicts that mind attribution is 
derived from an internal source, where the person uses their own mind to predict the mind of 
someone else (Carruthers & Smith, 1996).  Because people might view the minds of those who 
agree with them as closer to their own, they may give more internal mind attributions for those 
who agree with their moral convictions and more external attributions for those who disagree.  
There is research suggesting that it is more difficult for a person to put themselves in the mind of 
someone who is distant (Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010; Trope, Liberman & Wakslak, 
2007).  For example, one reason socially distant others, such as outgroup members, reduce  a 
person’s empathy and willingness to help (Levine & Thompson, 2004) may be because reducing 
similarities or closeness reduces the ability to perceive experience, or to put yourself in the shoes 
of another (Baron & Miller, 2000).  This is true not only for groups of national identity (Levine 
& Thompson, 2004) and cultural identity (Baron & Miller, 2000); one study in particular found 
that participants in a dictator game were more generous for those whose name they knew than for 
those who remained anonymous (Charness & Gneezy, 2008).  Therefore, how much capability of 
thought, and of moral reasoning, a person assigns to another may depend on how close to their 
own mind they perceive the other person’s mind to be. 
 There may also be evolutionary implications as to why we perceive distant others as 
having less capability for moral reasoning.  Previous research suggests that we’re more willing to 
come to the aid of those with greater similarities and social closeness (Hoffman, 1978).  Because 
we may perceive and create distance between ourselves and those with whom we disagree, 
empathy for those with similar beliefs—and lack of empathy for those with dissimilar beliefs — 
may be one way in which preference for similar groups produces behavior that propagates the 
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need of the many through something like selective altruism (Leak & Christopher, 1982).  
Because we share the most with our ingroup, or those with whom we agree, we are naturally 
more capable of understanding their perspective, feeling their problems, and generating empathy 
for them (Levine & Thompson, 2004).  Taking the perspective of a person becomes more 
difficult given a lack of shared moral convictions; without similarities to fall back on, 
understanding the dilemmas of the other and feeling their pain is problematic and may dissolve 
any concern or motivation to help, thus restricting helping behavior to the group with the most 
shared moral convictions. 
 Another explanation for why we might perceive distant others as less capable of moral 
reasoning may be a result of naïve realism (Ward & Ross, 1997).  That is, we may sometimes 
perceive the world only in relation to what we directly see and feel and then construe this to be 
the absolute truth of the world.  In this way, a person might consider their moral conviction, as it 
is in their direct internal experience, to be the only true moral conviction, and anyone who may 
disagree with them is perceived either as having a false belief or as being influenced by 
something external.  Naïve realism might predict that we assume everyone thinks as we do, and 
when they do not we assume they are either not thinking or having some external influence 
preventing them from thinking. 
 What we propose is that people perceive their own morality as stemming from internal 
factors, essentially an internal moral compass, while often perceiving any beliefs that are in 
opposition with their own moral compass as stemming from external factors exclusive of an 
internal capability for moral reasoning.  As isolated beings, we may sometimes lack the 
perspective to see outside of our own minds.  Like fish that can’t see the water they swim in, we 
might not be able to see the minds of others when they disagree with our morals. 
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Study 1 
The first study examined the explanations that people naturally provide for other people’s 
moral beliefs. Inspired by the history of colonialism, we manipulated moral disagreement so that 
each participant provided explanations for why they believed someone would agree or disagree 
with their views on a certain moral conviction. We also manipulated whether the other person 
was seen as a particularly noteworthy contributor to society.  Our inclusion of this “good” 
condition was to ascertain if participants would continue to ascribe less mind to those who 
disagree with their conviction despite a description that might close distance between any 
perceived dissimilarities. We predicted that people would naturally provide internal attributions 
to themselves and people who agree with their moral opinions, but provide either an external or 
savage internal reason for those who disagree with their moral opinions. 
Method 
 Participants.  A total of 192 participants completed the survey via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (Mturk) in exchange for $0.20.   Twenty-six participants failed the 
informational manipulation check, leaving 164 participants (Mage= 33.83, 55% female, 59% 
liberal, all from the United States). 
 Procedure.  This study used a 2 (agreement: disagree vs agree) x 2 (character: neutral vs 
good guy) x 2 (person: other vs. self) between and within subjects design, and looked at how 
people explain moral opinions regarding four morally controversial topics: abortion, same-sex 
marriage, euthanasia, and the death penalty. We selected to explore these four issues because 
they are among the top most controversial issues in the United States (Saad, 2010).  Participants 
first indicated their moral opinion about each of the four issues on a binary scale, selecting 
whether each is or is not immoral.  Participants were then randomly assigned into either the 
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agreement or disagreement condition and one character condition, reading about either a neutral 
man who opposed or agreed with their indicated belief (e.g. “John believes that same-sex 
marriage is morally permissible.  He feels strongly about this position.”), or a “good” man (e.g. 
“John is a hardworking professional who goes out of his way to regularly help his colleagues. 
Among other things, John believes that same-sex marriage is morally permissible.  He feels 
strongly about this position.”). After reading about an individual, participants responded to an 
open-ended question asking them why they believe the described person holds his view.  After 
ascribing reasons for beliefs regarding all four issues, participants were then asked to reflect on 
their own moral opinion, and describe the reason they hold their own views.  Finally, these open-
ended responses were looped back to participants, who were asked to rate whether the person 
holds the view due to internal or external factors, with lower numbers indicating more internal
1
 
factors.  Participants then completed questions about demographics and an attention check. 
Results 
Open-ended response. We first sought to code the open-ended responses according to 
whether the participants attributed beliefs to internal-savage reasons (e.g. they are idiots, they are 
uneducated), external reasons (e.g. that is what they were taught by parents or religion), or 
internal reasons (e.g. he believes that it is right).  Canonical examples of each of these categories 
repeatedly emerged from the data (see Table 1).  However, a preliminary attempt to code the 
open-ended responses for inferential statistics quickly revealed some important limitations for 
                                                          
1 To provide greater context for this decision, participants first read: “There are many reasons why 
people form moral judgments.  Some moral judgments might emerge from a person's internal 
moral compass, a person's deep understanding about what is right or wrong.  Other moral 
judgments could result from external factors.  People might hold a particular view because that is 
what they have been taught, or led to believe by peers, parents, politics, religion or society. In the 
following task, please rate whether a moral belief stemmed from an internal or external factor.”    
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coding the responses. Although some responses clearly fit into one of the three categories, it was 
often unclear where a reason fit.  For example, one participant wrote that “John may hold 
traditional conservative values.  He may believe that male-female relationships are the ‘correct’ 
way.”  Another wrote, “He [has] read the Bible.”  Further examples of these ambiguous 
responses are provided in Table 2.  The explanation that John believes in the Bible is an appeal 
to external rules, but a belief is an internal state.  An atheist researcher might be tempted to label 
this as following the external rule of the Bible, but a theist might claim that the Bible is part of 
one’s internal compass, and that the person is a good, reasonable being.  Out of hesitance to 
overly impose our own notions of internal, external, and “savage” internal, we therefore turn to 
the self-ratings of internality and externality, and use the open-ended responses as an illustrative 
tool to form a representative understanding of participants’ beliefs. 
Ratings.   
Same-sex marriage.  A 2x2 between-subject ANOVA revealed a marginally significant 
overall effect, F(3,161) = 2.46, p = .07, ηp
2
=.04.  There was a significant main effect of 
agreement F(1,161) = 6.15, p = .01, ηp
2
 = .04, such that the participants who read about someone 
agreeing with them rated the reasons as more internal (M = 2.27, SD = .93) than the reasons of 
the person disagreeing with them (M = 2.64, p = .97) (see Figure 1). There was neither a main 
effect of goodness, F(1,161) = .63, p = .43, nor a significant interaction between goodness and 
agreement, F(1, 161)= .68, p = .41. Since character did not have a significant effect, it was 
dropped from the analysis regarding differences between self vs other.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (self 
vs. other) between and within subject ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect of agreement 
F(1, 163) = 4.06, p = .05, ηp
2  
= .02, a significant main effect of self vs other, F(1, 163) = 23.06, p 
< .001, ηp
2  
= .12, and no significant interaction, F(1,163) = 1.29, p = .26.  Relative to a person’s 
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own moral views (M = 2.00, SD = 1.08), both the agreeing (M = 2.27, SD = .93), p = .01, and 
disagreeing (M = 2.64, SD = .97), p < .001, were seen as more external. 
Abortion. A 2x2 between subject ANOVA revealed a significant overall effect, F(3,161) 
= 2.71, p = .07-5, ηp
2
=.05.  There was a significant main effect of agreement F(1,161) = 4.71, p = 
.03, ηp
2
= .03, such that the participants who read about someone agreeing with them rated the 
reasons as more internal (M = 2.17, SD = .95) than the reasons of the person disagreeing with 
them (M = 2.49, p = .1.00) (Figure 1). There was not a main effect of goodness, F(1,161) = .78, p 
= .40, but there was a marginally significant interaction between goodness and agreement, F(1, 
161)= 2.72, p = .10. ηp
2
= .02, such that goodness did not change ratings in the agreement 
conditions (p = .60), but did correspond with a shift in attribution in the disagree condition (p = 
.07), with the good disagreeing person attributed more internal reasons (M = 2.30, SD = .94), 
than the neutral disagreeing person (M = 2.69, SD = 1.05).  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (self vs. other) 
between and within subject ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect of agreement F(1, 163) 
= 3.86, p = .05, ηp
2  
= .02, a significant main effect of self vs other, F(1, 163) = 13.35, p < .001, 
ηp
2  
= .08, and no significant interaction, F(1,163) = .68, p = .41. Relative to a person’s own 
moral views (M = 1.98, SD = 1.01), both the agreeing (M = 2.17, SD = .95), p = .05, and 
disagreeing (M = 2.49, SD = 1.01), p < .001, were seen as more external. 
Death Penalty.  A 2x2 between-subject ANOVA did not reveal an overall effect, F(3, 
161) = .83, p = .47, ηp
2 
= .01.  There was not a significant main effect of either agreement, F(1, 
161) = 2.36, p = .12, ηp
2
 = .01 or goodness, F(1, 161) = .12, p = .72, ηp
2
 = .001, and there was not 
an interaction between goodness and agreement, F(1, 161) = .004, p = .94, ηp
2
 = .00.  Similarly, a 
2 (agreement) x 2 (self vs. other) between and within subject ANOVA resulted in no significant 
main effect of agreement F(1, 163) = .15, p = .70, but a significant main effect of self vs other, 
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F(1, 163) = 4.26, p = .04, ηp
2  
= .03, and a marginally significant interaction, F(1,163) = 3.14, p = 
.08. The disagreeing view (M = 2.37, SD = .85) was seen as more external relative to a person’s 
own views (M = 2.08, SD = 1.10), p < .001, although the agreeing opinion did not significantly 
differ (M = 2.17, SD = .87), p = .84. 
Euthanasia.  A 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant overall effect, F(3, 
161) = 3.39, p = .01, ηp
2
 = .05.  There was not a main effect of agreement, F(1, 161) = 2.20, p = 
.14, ηp
2
 = .01, but there was a main effect of goodness, F(1, 161) = 4.92, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .03, such 
that participants who read about a “good” person rated the reasons as more internal (M = 2.08, 
SD = .85) than when they read about a neutral person (M = 2.35, SD = .83).  There was a 
marginally significant interaction between goodness and agreement, F(1, 161) = 3.34, p = .06, 
ηp
2
 = .02, such that goodness did not change ratings in the disagreement conditions (p = .77) but 
did correspond with a shift in attributions in the agreement conditions (p = .006), with the good 
agreeing person attributed more internal reasons (M = 1.85, SD = .83) than the neutral agreeing 
person (M = 2.38, SD = .86).  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (self vs. other) between and within subject 
ANOVA resulted in no significant main effect of agreement F(1, 163) = .16, p = .70, but a 
significant main effect of self vs other, F(1,163) = 10.45, p = .001, ηp
2  
= .06, and a marginally 
significant interaction, F(1, 163) = 3.02, p = .08, ηp
2   
= .02. The disagreeing view (M = 2.31, SD 
= .82) was seen as more external relative to a person’s own views (M = 1.92, SD = 1.00), p < 
.001, although the agreeing opinion did not significantly differ (M = 2.10, SD = .85), p = .32. 
Overview.  The findings in study one support our predictions in issues such as abortion 
and same-sex marriage.  Participants tend to assign greater internal attributions to the beliefs of 
those who agree with them than the beliefs of those who disagree with them. 
Study 2 
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The following study sought to further explore how people attribute moral disagreement.   
It was predicted that people would ascribe internal attributions to their own beliefs, but perceive 
the beliefs of those who disagree with them morally as being derived from an external source. 
Method 
 Participants.  A total of 203 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(Mturk) to participate in our second study in exchange for $.40.  Twenty-three participants were 
excluded for failing that informational manipulation check, leaving 180 participants (Mage = 31, 
64% male, 58% liberal),  
 Procedure.  Just as in study one, this study used a 2 (agreement: disagree vs agree) x 2 
(character: neutral vs good guy) x 2 (person: other vs. self) between and within subject design, 
with participants reading about a person who held a similar or opposing view, who was either 
described in neutral terms or as a good person, before rating their own views.  The second study 
had two key changes from Study 1: The second study focused on only two politically contentious 
issues, same-sex marriage and abortion, and used specific questions gauging attribution of beliefs 
instead of open-ended responses. After each vignette, instead of an open-ended question 
participants rated the extent to which they agreed with statements about the attribution of the 
described person’s conviction on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree).  
Statements included a range of external-savage attributions such as, “John is uneducated on the 
issue,” (abortion, α = .81, same-sex marriage α = .83) external attribution statements, “John has 
been influenced by his upbringing,” (abortion α = .69, same-sex marriage α = .76 ) and internal 
moral questions, “John is following his own internal moral compass” (abortion α = .60, same-sex 
marriage α = .66). These statements appeared in random order, and after rating these statements, 
participants rated whether John holds his view because of internal or external factors from (1) 
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Definitely Internal to (4) Definitely External (for a full list of statements, see Table 3).  As in 
study 1, participants also completed questions about demographics and attention checks 
subsequent to the moral situations. 
Results 
Abortion. 
Savage.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (character) between subject ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of agreement, F(1,176) = 79.76, p < .001, ηp
2
 =  .31, no main effect of character, 
F(1,176) = 1.18, p = .28, and no significant interaction between character and agreement, 
F(1,176) = 1.57, p = .21.  Since character did not have a significant effect, it was dropped from 
the analysis regarding differences between self vs other.  In addition to a main effect of 
agreement, F(1,178) = 25.33, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .13, a 2 (agreement) x 2 (self vs. other) between and 
within subject ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of self vs other, F (1,178) = 200.42, p 
< .001, ηp
2
 = .53, and a significant interaction F(1,178) = 82.57, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .32.  Planned 
contrasts showed that others’ disagreements (M = 2.86, SD = .70) were viewed as more savage 
than agreeing opinions (M = 1.89, SD = .74) which were both viewed as more savage than one’s 
own beliefs (M = 1.53, SD = .67), p < .001.   
External.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (character) between subject ANOVA resulted in a 
significant main effect of agreement, F(1,176) = 42.18, p < .001, ηp
2
 =  .19, was a main effect of 
character, F(1,176) = 9.60, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .05, such that the good character was ascribed more 
external reasons (M = 3.52, SD = .76), relative to the neutral character (M = 3.18, SD = .91).  and 
no significant interaction between character and agreement, F(1,176) = .33, p = .57. A 2 
(agreement) x 2 (self vs. other) between and within subject ANOVA once again revealed a main 
effect of agreement, F(1,178) = 8.27, p = .005, ηp
2
 = .04, a significant main effect of self vs 
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other, F(1,178) = 225.06, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .56, and a significant interaction F(1,178) = 33.63, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .32.  Others disagreements (M = 3.70, SD = .83) were viewed as more external than 
the agreeing opinion (M = 2.97, SD = .71), p < .001 which were both seen as more external than 
one’s own beliefs (M = 2.13, SD = .87), p < .001. 
Internal.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (character) between subject ANOVA resulted in a 
significant main effect of agreement, F(1,176) = 25.63, p < .001, ηp
2
 =  .13.  There was not a 
main effect of character, F(1,176) = .84, p = .36, nor a significant interaction between character 
and agreement, F(1,176) = .54, p = .46.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (self vs. other) between and within 
subject ANOVA revealed a main effect of agreement, F(1,178) = 8.63, p = .004, ηp
2
 = .05, a 
significant main effect of self vs other, F(1,178) = 35.58, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .17, and a significant 
interaction F(1,178) = 14.25, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .07.  Disagreements (M = 3.38, SD = .71) were 
viewed as significantly less internal than agreeing opinions (M = 3.89, SD = .61), p < .001.  
Disagreeing opinions were more external than one’s own beliefs (M = 4.02, SD = .81), p < .001, 
though agreeing opinions did not differ significantly from the person’s own belief, p = .13. 
Internal-External. Turning to the global rating of whether people believed a reason 
stems from internal or external factors, a 2 (agreement) x 2 (character) between-subjects 
ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect of agreement, F(1,176) = 11.65, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .06, 
no main effect of character, F(1,176) = .29, p = .59, and no significant interaction between 
agreement and character, F (1,176) = 2.16, p = .14.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (self vs. other) between- 
and within-subject ANOVA revealed a marginal main effect of agreement, F(1,178) = 3.50, p = 
.06, ηp
2
 = .02, self vs other, F(1, 178) = 75.65, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .30, and a significant interaction 
between agreement and self vs. other, F(1,178) = 5.43, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .03. Planned contrasts 
revealed that participants ascribed more external reasons to opposing views of others (M = 2.54, 
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SD = .69) than agreeing views (M = 2.22, SD = .62), p = 001, which were both more external 
than one’s own views (M = 1.81, SD = .86), p < .001 (see Figure 2).  
Same Sex Marriage. 
Savage.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (character) between subject ANOVA resulted in a 
significant main effect of agreement, F(1,176) = 110.67, p < .001, ηp
2
=  .39. There was not a 
main effect of character, F(1,176) = .56, p = .45, nor a significant interaction between character 
and agreement, F(1,176) = .25, p = .62.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (self vs. other) between and within 
subject ANOVA revealed a main effect of agreement, F(1,178) = 55.84, p < .001, ηp
2
= .24, a 
significant main effect of self vs other, F (1,178) = 268.12, p < .001, ηp
2
= .60, and a significant 
interaction F(1,178) = 96.41, p < .001, ηp
2
= .35.  Planned contrasts showed that others 
disagreements were viewed as more savage than one’s own beliefs (M = 1.46, SD = .53), p < 
.001.  The agreeing opinion (M = 1.86, SD = .73), was rated as less savage than the disagreeing 
opinion, (M = 3.06, SD = .79) p < .001, although it was also rated significantly different than the 
person’s own belief (M = 1.46, SD = .58), p < .001. 
External.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (character) between subject ANOVA resulted in a 
significant main effect of agreement, F(1,176) = 91.11, p < .001, ηp
2
=  .34. There was not a main 
effect of character, F(1,176) = .21, p = .65, nor a significant interaction between character and 
agreement, F(1,176) = .24, p = .63.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (self vs. other) between and within 
subject ANOVA revealed a main effect of agreement, F(1,178) = 29.50, p < .001, ηp
2
= .14, a 
significant main effect of self vs other, F (1,178) = 275.49, p < .001, ηp
2
= .61, and a significant 
interaction F(1,178) = 51.04, p < .001, ηp
2
= .22.  Planned contrasts showed that others 
disagreements (M = 3.97, SD = .74) were viewed as more external than agreeing opinion (M = 
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2.93, SD = .71), p < .001 which were both more severe than one’s own beliefs (M = 2.15, SD = 
.85), p < .001. 
Internal.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (character) between subject ANOVA resulted in a 
significant main effect of agreement, F(1,176) = 66.58, p < .001, ηp
2
=  .27, no main effect of 
character, F(1,176) = .007, p = .97, nor a significant interaction between character and 
agreement, F(1,176) = .27, p = .61.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (self vs. other) between and within 
subject ANOVA revealed a main effect of agreement, F(1,178) = 25.61, p < .001, ηp
2
= .13, a 
significant main effect of self vs other, F (1,178) = 68.98, p < .001, ηp
2
= .28, and a significant 
interaction F(1,178) = 33.20, p < .001, ηp
2
= .16.  Planned contrasts showed that others 
disagreements (M = 3.17, SD = .72) were viewed as less internal than the agreeing opinion (M = 
3.98, SD = .60), which was less internal than one’s own beliefs (M = 4.15, SD = .77), p < .001.  
Internal_External.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (character) between subject ANOVA resulted in 
a significant main effect of agreement, F(1,176) = 44.39, p < .001, ηp
2
=  .20, no main effect of 
character, F(1,176) = 1.13, p = .29, nor a significant interaction between character and 
agreement, F(1,176) = 1.53, p = .22.  A 2 (agreement) x 2 (self vs. other) between and within 
subject ANOVA revealed a main effect of agreement, F(1,178) = 14.76, p < .001, ηp
2
= .08, a 
significant main effect of self vs other, F (1,178) = 37.80, p < .001, ηp
2
= .30, and a significant 
interaction F(1,178) = 19.70, p < .001, ηp
2
= .10.  Planned contrasts showed that others’ 
disagreements (M = 2.80, SD = .75) were viewed as less internal than the agreeing opinion (M = 
2.10, SD = .68), which was less internal than one’s own beliefs (M = 1.81, SD = .91), p < .004 
(see Figure 3).   
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Overview.  The findings in study two support our predictions.  Participants attributed 
their own beliefs to the most internal reasons and the beliefs of those who agreed with their 
moral convictions on abortion and same-sex marriage to more internal reasons than the beliefs of 
those who disagreed with their convictions. 
General Discussion 
 Overall, what our study found was that agreement does have an effect on attribution of 
beliefs, such that participants attributed the beliefs of those who agreed with them to more 
internal reasons and the beliefs of those that disagreed with them to more external reasons.  For 
potential causes we will shortly attempt to elaborate on, this was true more for issues such as 
same-sex marriage and abortion than the issues of the death penalty and euthanasia.  The 
character of the person opposing or supporting participants’ convictions did have some effect in 
that sometimes this shifted attributions either to more internal for the agreeing person or more 
external for the disagreeing person.  Ultimately, this pattern reflects the patterns we predicted; 
for those who oppose our moral convictions, we view them less as thinking, reasoning beings 
and more as immoral savages or rule-following idiots without the capacity for internal morality. 
 The implications for our findings provide insight into how moral debates occur and are 
perpetuated.  Because we cannot see the other side as having internal morality, we dismiss their 
convictions as inferior and resort to insults.  However, it may be possible to bridge this distance 
and create understanding if similar character qualities are emphasized during a debate.  This 
holds implications for how we see others and their morality across cultures, across social 
barriers, and other distances that accentuate dissimilarities between groups. 
 One area our findings seem to have the most relevance is in political debates, such as the 
ongoing debate between Republican and Democratic parties in the US.  This is a debate that has 
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provoked vigorous hostility across many forums, from alternating insults in a comments page on 
the internet to a political candidate’s televised slurring of another.  In 2014, Katherine Martin 
created a lexicon of the insults most often used to belittle each party, including which insults 
were used most frequently.  The offensive term most often used to refer to Democrats was 
“hack,” and the term most used for Republicans was “extremist” (Martin 2014).  What this 
shows is that neither side in the debate is prone to treating the opposing side fairly.  
Undoubtedly, slinging insults is at best unproductive to the debate and at worst prolongs the 
argument and sharpens the divide of hostility between parties.  If there was a way to maintain 
healthier debates that advance rather than detract from the significance of the issues they 
concern, then it may be that research on emphasizing similarities will help foster better debates 
and diffuse hostility. 
 The divide between internal and external attribution of beliefs can also apply in the 
context of cultural differences.  This is most often seen in the case of religious differences, such 
as Christians being pejoratively referred to as “Bible-thumpers” or atheists as “Satanists.”  An 
external attribution fosters these insults by increasing the perception that those who disagree with 
a person’s moral convictions are morally inferior.  Not all cultural differences are religious, 
however.  Asian cultures, for instance, are sometimes pejoratively referred to as “dog-eaters” or 
“dog-munchers” due to the morally controversial consumption of dog meat in some countries.  In 
this case, an internal attribution would promote cultural understanding that would diminish racial 
slurs and other affronts based on an external, morally inferior perspective. 
 Future research could apply itself to understanding attributions in terms of cultural 
differences through a study on food differences.  The applications of such a study would concern 
the differences in rituals or cultural practices associated with food across cultures and the internal 
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or external attributions that would be assigned to these practices based on whether they support 
or oppose someone’s particular beliefs and practices.  For example, it is a common practice in 
the Hindu culture to refrain from consuming beef or beef products, whereas it is a common 
practice in the US to consume beef and beef products.  A study designed to test the attributions 
associated with food practices could make use of these differences to determine whether the 
same pattern that occurs with moral disagreement would emerge. 
 One limitation of the present studies is that we did not include a measure to determine 
how strongly participants held their moral convictions to determine if the effect of attribution 
was strengthened by strong beliefs.  Future research may wish to include the strength of moral 
convictions (Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005) as a moderator of attribution.  Furthermore, our 
manipulations of agreement and character did not have strong effects within the contexts of the 
death penalty and euthanasia.  This may be because people do not view these issues in as black 
and white a manner as they do issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion, or even because 
people simply do not have as much concern for these issues as they do for the others.  Perhaps 
because these issues are so controversial, people inherently understand that there is another side 
to the debate with a legitimate intellectual perspective.  The effects of agreement might be 
strengthened within the issues of death penalty and euthanasia by stronger moral convictions 
from participants, or by removing the controversial nature of issues such as death penalty and 
euthanasia.  If, for example, participants were asked to attribute beliefs about issues such as 
incest to external or internal beliefs, they might be more likely to see these beliefs as external 
because they would not as readily recognize that there is an existing opposing side to their own 
beliefs.  Therefore, future studies may wish to control for the strength of participant’s 
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convictions and the extent to which they understand the issue at hand as a black-and-white 
concern. 
 Although our manipulation of character did not have much effect on attribution, there 
is evidence in the literature of moral psychology that people do assign greater agency to a person 
depending on the character traits and values of that person (Sripada and Konrath, 2011).  This 
lack of effect could be something specific to our design that may yet have an effect in future 
research.  Because our neutral character was not given any cultural identification, however, it is 
possible that given this lack of traits and values people chose to perceive this neutral character as 
naturally good, and therefore naturally similar, because they chose to rely on a heuristic 
concerned with people they see every day.  Future research could investigate whether character 
manipulation has a stronger effect for a food study across cultures, for example, where the 
neutral character would still be identified as culturally distinct.   
 Despite these limitations, our findings have implications for how researchers 
themselves conduct cross-cultural research.  Early moral research focused only on harm and care 
as moral concerns (Kohlberg, 1966), and anthropological research in the 90s suggested there 
existed moral concerns without clear victims, such as using a flag to clean a toilet or necrophilia 
(Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993).  From this evidence, researchers concluded that people moralize 
things based on cultural norms about morality and purity.  It is possible, based on our findings 
about internal and external attribution, that researchers may have jumped to external attributions 
too quickly, failing to see the internal moral compass that might drive moral norms.  Likewise, 
research on the differences of moral judgements in politics suggests that the debate between 
parties such as liberals and conservatives stem from different moral foundations (Graham, Haidt 
& Nosek, 2009).  Although it may be true that researchers and participants alike may perceive 
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those who oppose their moral convictions as relying on separate rules, it may be just as likely 
that we are misrepresenting the extent to which we are all unable to see outside of our own 
internal perspective. 
 Our findings display a difference in how attribution is typically ascribed.  Most often, 
attribution bias determines that we are quicker to ascribe external reasons to our own behavior 
and internal reasons to others’ behavior (e.g. perceiving a waiter as a rude person when they 
exhibit rude behavior, but understanding that you had a bad day when you do the same).  What 
this difference in attribution suggests is that it internal and external attributions are situational; 
we are quick to ascribe our moral convictions, something we perceive as good, to an internal 
attribution and our bad behaviors to an external attribution.  In this way, attribution allows us to 
take credit for our good behaviors but not our bad.  Just like the researchers that ascribed external 
rule-following attribution to moral concerns, however, we may be too quickly dismissing the 
external factors that drive our own behaviors and convictions.  Either we must accept that others 
have internal reasons driving their beliefs, or we must understand that even our own behaviors 
are driven by external forces.  Nisbet and Wilson (1977), for example, determined that we fail to 
recognize the sources for our own beliefs, and that we do not know ourselves as thoroughly as 
we might like to think.  Thus, in failing to recognize the internal attributions of others, we may 
also be failing to recognize the external attributions for ourselves, unable to see beyond ourselves 
and our own hearts and minds.  
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Table 1. 
 Same-sex Marriage Abortion Death Penalty Euthanasia 
Internal “Savage”  
Attribution 
“John has no 
morals.” 
“He does not 
recognize that [the 
fetus] is a human 
life.” 
“If [he would 
consider my point of 
view] then [he] 
would change [his 
mind].” 
 
“He is immoral.” 
 
 “He is ignorant.” “Lack of research.” “He may be 
vengeful.” 
 
“He does not 
recognize that all life 
is to be respected.” 
 
External  
“Rule Following” 
 Attribution 
“He was raised to 
believe this by 
idiots.” 
 
“He [is from] a 
patriarchal society.” 
 
“He is misinformed.” 
 
“Because that is how 
he was raised.” 
 “Because he is a 
Christian.” 
“He was raised to 
believe it is 
immoral.” 
“He was brought up 
in a way that has 
fixed his view.” 
“He might have 
religious beliefs that 
tell him it’s wrong to 
kill anyone.” 
 
Internal Compass  
Attribution 
“He believes in 
traditional marriage.” 
 
“He believes in 
personal choice.” 
 
“He finds value in 
every life.” 
 
“He believes 
someone has a right 
to end their life.” 
 
 “He believes in 
equality.” 
“George believes in 
the value of life.” 
“He believes in an 
eye for an eye.” 
“He believes nobody 
should have the 
power to take away a 
life.” 
Examples of attribution for each category of attribution, as taken from the open-ended responses 
in Study 1.  
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Table 2. 
Same-Sex Marriage Abortion Death Penalty Euthanasia 
“He is a good person.” “He is liberal.” “Because he is allowed to 
have choices.” 
 
“He is devoted to the 
human race.” 
“He’s gay.” “He is a nice guy.” “He has had a bad 
experience with 
criminals.” 
 
“His wife was 
euthanized.” 
“He is young and has an 
open mind.” 
“He had a friend who had 
an abortion.” 
“In the Bible he is 
correct.” 
“He wants to teach good 
values to his child.” 
Examples of ambiguous responses for each subject, as taken from the open-ended responses in 
Study 1. 
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Table 3. 
Study Two Statements 
“John is uneducated on the issue” 
“John has not thought critically about the issue” 
“John is stupid.” 
“John has been influenced by family/friends.” 
“John has thought about the issue and has simply drawn a 
different conclusion than I have.” 
“John is weird.” 
“John is simply following political/religious rules.” 
“John is following his own internal moral compass.” 
 Statements as they appeared for rating in study two. 
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Figure 1. Differences in Internal and External Attribution by subject. 
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Figure 2.  Differences in agreement with attribution type for abortion. 
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Figure 3.  Differences in agreement with attribution type for same-sex marriage. 
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